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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, Congress has enacted a number of statutory provi-
sions which operate as presumptions in criminal prosecutions. These pro-
visions operate to lessen the burden of the prosecution and are found
principally, though not exclusively, in the fields of narcotics control and
taxation of liquor. Perhaps the best example of such a device was the
presumption found in the recently repealed federal narcotics drug law.
The crime proscribed consisted of three elements: (1) illegal importation
of a narcotic drug; (2) knowledge that the drug was illegally imported;
and, (3) possession of an illegally imported drug. Once possession was
established, a statutory presumption1 came into play which enabled the
trier of fact to presume the existence of the other two elements of the
crime. Proof of one element of a three element offense thus became suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction. Similarly, presence at the sight of an illicit
"still" had been made sufficient to authorize conviction of a variety of
offenses under the federal alcohol tax acts.' The constitutionality of these
presumptions has been the subject of extensive judicial and scholarly
comment. The arguments questioning the constitutionality of such de-
vices were recently brought into focus by Mr. Justice Black in a dissent-
ing opinion in Turner v. United States.
The purposes of this paper are: first, to examine the validity of the
* Member of the Florida Bar; Member of the firm of Gerson & Fuller.
** Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. The Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, ch. 9, § 4, 38 Stat. 275, 21 U.S.C. 174
(1964) ; repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 12 F.C.A. Public Laws and Administrative Material 1347 (1970). The former
provision made possession sufficient to authorize conviction of buying or selling narcotics
known to have been imported unlawfully, unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury.
2. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5601(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4) (1964) (relating to distilling
operations). See also 50 U.S.C. APP. § 462(b) (Supp. V, 1970) (unlawful to possess draft
card not issued to the holder with intent to use for purposes of identification; possession
sufficient evidence of intent unless explained) and 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1964) (possession of
unlawfully imported goods sufficient for conviction of smuggling, unless explained). And see
15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1964) (relating to firearms).
3. 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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objections advanced by Mr. Justice Black; second, to determine whether
the value of the above named presumptions warrant their continued ap-
plication; third, to briefly note the development of the current test for
constitutionality of criminal law presumptions and examine the validity
of that test; and fourth, to propose an alternative test for determining
the permissibility of criminal law presumptions.
II. MR. JUSTICE BLACK'S OBJECTIONS
Mr. Justice Black argued that statutory presumptions which oper-
ate to establish elements of a crime undermine many of the safeguards
of the Federal Bill of Rights.4 He presented a number of arguments
against the use of presumptions generally. Such presumptions, according
to Mr. Justice Black, violate the presumption of innocence.
The fundamental right of the defendant to be presumed innocent
is swept away to precisely the extent judges and juries rely upon
the statutory presumptions of guilt.5
The classical presumption of innocence seems to be as crucial to the
traditional concept of Anglo-American jurisprudence as the right to a
trial by jury.6 The guarantee to a jury trial has been reported as reflect-
ing "a profound judgment about the way" justice should be administered."
Clearly, the classical presumption of innocence reflects an equally pro-
found judgment. Yet, when presumptive devices are employed in criminal
proceedings the classical presumption of innocence is necessarily affected
to some degree. Mr. Justice Black argued that the effect of presumptive
devices on this classical concept of criminal law is impermissible.
Statutory presumptions such as those involved in this case rob
the defendant of at least part of his presumed innocence and cast
upon him the burden of proving that he is not guilty.... How-
ever, so far as robbing the defendant of his presumption of
innocence is concerned, it makes no difference whether the stat-
ute explicitly says the defendant can rebut the presumption of
guilt . . . or whether the statute simply uses the language of
prima facie case and leaves implicit the possibility of the de-
fendant's rebutting the presumption .... 8
Arguably, statutory presumptions violate criminal due process of law
in that they affect the presumption of innocence. Additionally, statutory
4. The dissenting opinion in Turner v. United States is the logical outgrowth of several
of Mr. Justice Black's previous opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63,
84-85 (1965) (dissenting opinion); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 204 (1960);
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 473 (1943) (concurring opinion).
5. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 430 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
6. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See also Williams v. State, 30 Ala. App. 495,
500, 8 So.2d 271, 274 (1942); Mulkey v. State, 1 Ga. App. 521, 57 S.E. 1022 (1907).
7. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
8. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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presumptions are destructive of other due process guarantees. While
legislatures have the power to define crimes, they have no power to relieve
the government of the constitutionally imposed burden of proving the
essential elements of its case by a mere declaration that certain evidence
shall be deemed sufficient to convict.9 As Mr. Justice Black stated the
argument:
Congress can undoubtedly create crimes and define their ele-
ments, but it cannot under our Constitution even partially re-
move from the prosecution the burden of proving at trial each
of the elements it has defined.'
In short, statutory criminal presumptions are generally irreconciliable
with substantive due process.
Statutory criminal presumptions, in Mr. Justice Black's view, under-
cut the fifth and sixth amendment requirements that a person held for
criminal prosecution shall be charged on presentment or indictment of a
grand jury, and that he be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation.
The purpose of these requirements is obviously to compel the
Government to state and define specifically what it must prove in
order to convict the defendant so that he can intelligently pre-
pare to defend himself on each of the essential elements of the
charge.'1
When the presumptive device is employed, the accused is unable to deter-
mine from the charge itself the specific elements of the offense which
the government will attempt to prove by the production of evidence. The
legislature's determination replaces that of the grand jury by determining
that certain evidence is sufficient to warrant an indictment. Being un-
able to determine what evidence the government will be required to pro-
duce, the defendant is unable to determine what evidence might be per-
tinent to impeach or rebut the Government's evidence.
Justice Black also argued that criminal presumptive devices also
undermine the right to trial by an impartial jury.
The right to trial by jury includes the right to have the jury and
the jury alone.., find the facts of the case, including the crucial
fact of guilt or innocence .... This right to have the jury deter-
mine guilt or innocence necessarily includes the right to have
that body decide whether the evidence presented at trial is suffi-
cient to convict.' 2
When the trial judge, upon the directive of Congress, instructs the jury
9. "The power to create presumptions is not a means to escape from constitutional re-
strictions." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 (1964).
10. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
11. Id. at 427-28.
12. Id. at 431.
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that certain evidence shall be sufficient to authorize conviction or to
establish a prima facie case, the right to have the jury make an impartial
determination as to guilt is inevitably weakened."3
Congress, in enacting the statutory presumptions purporting to
define and limit the quantum of evidence necessary to convict,
has injected its own views and controls into the guilt-determin-
ing, fact-finding process vested by our Constitution exclusively
in the Judicial Branch of our Government. 4
Statutory presumptive devices weaken the power of judges to direct
verdicts or set aside convictions in those instances where the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law. Where the legislature interposes its judg-
ment as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant conviction for that
of the court's, it clearly and simply eliminates the judicial check upon
the jury's determination provided for in the constitutional plan of crim-
inal procedure. By substituting its evaluation, the legislature has affected
various stages of the criminal trial. "Congress can declare a crime, but
it must leave the trial of that crime to the courts." 5
Statutory presumptions deprive the accused of the right to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him and the right to compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses for his defense in Black's judgment. The appellate
courts, in dealing with presumptions, generally do not respond to the
weighty constitutional problems inherent in such devices. Rather, they
approach the issues with a view toward determining whether the pre-
sumptions are "reasonable," "fair," or "rational" in terms of the statu-
tory conclusion that when the proved fact occurs the presumed fact also
exists. In making these determinations, the appellate courts consider a
great deal of expert testimony in the form of books, studies, and statis-
tics. For example, the footnotes of the Court's opinion in Turner v. United
States are replete with a vast array of expert testimony cited as evidence
of the factual basis of the presumptions.' 8 The framework in which this
testimony is considered at the appellate level is radically different from
that employed in a criminal trial. At the appellate level, the testimony
is considered without benefit of a sponsor who can be cross-examined
regarding the profferred statistics. Moreover, the opportunity to produce
defense witnesses to challenge the validity of the statistics as well as
the right to compulsory process for obtaining these witnesses is weakened
to the same extent. The appellate court considers these statistics in a
bland, non-adversary posture in that it generally relies only upon pub-
13. It is not uncommon to find the statutory language read verbatim as part of the
jury's instructions. See United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); Griego v. United
States, 298 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1962).
14. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 431 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
15. Id. at 432.
16. See also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Gonzales v. United States, -
F.2d -, Case nos. 33618, 33624, and 33625 (2d Cir., decided Sept. 16, 1970); Erwing v.
United States, 323 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1963).
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lished reports and opinions. An attempt to introduce these same statis-
tics at a criminal trial would be subject to far greater defense scrutiny
and control than their mere inclusion in an appellate brief.
Justice Black argued that statutory presumptive devices undermine
the right to counsel. To the extent that the accused is denied the right
to confront witnesses against him, to call witnesses in his own behalf, and
to be informed of the specific elements involved within the offense charged,
his right to counsel becomes less meaningful. The elements of the offense
are not set forth in a fashion which will inform the defendant of which
elements the government must attempt to produce evidence to prove. If
the defendant misjudges the government's reliance on the statutory pre-
sumption, he may find himself unprepared to meet evidence of importa-
tion or knowledge which the government decides to establish without
benefit of the presumption. If the defendant prepares extensive statistical
arguments regarding the validity of the presumption, he is subject to the
same uncertainty. This inability to ascertain the precise elements in issue
diminishes the effectiveness of counsel.
Finally, Mr. Justice Black argued that statutory presumptive devices
violate the defendant's right against self-incrimination.
This privilege has been consistently interpreted to establish the
defendant's absolute right not to testify at his own trial unless
he freely chooses to do so . . . [t]he privilege is fulfilled only
when the person is guaranteed "the right . . to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will .... 1T
The denial of the privilege not to be compelled to be a witness
against oneself is the most frequently litigated constitutional challenge
to criminal presumptive devices. These attacks have been almost uni-
versally rejected," in spite of the spirit of the self-incrimination decisions
which is broad enough to encompass the type of compulsion to testify
that statutory criminal presumptions create. 19
These arguments enunciated by Mr. Justice Black are both emo-
tionally compelling and logically persuasive. The fact remains, however,
that they have been rarely expressly considered and never accepted by
the Supreme Court. The only argument which has been subject to signifi-
cant judicial consideration, that presumptive devices violate the protec-
tions against self-incrimination, is the argument most susceptible to dis-
pute. Several courts have rejected this self-incrimination argument, rea-
soning that the presumed facts could be rebutted by evidence other than
17. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432-33 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
18. See Anglin v. State, 244 Md. 652, 224 A.2d 668 (1966); Note, The Privilege to Re-
main Silent and the Presumption of Larceny Based on Unexplained Possession, 24 U. MrAMU
L. REV. 200 (1969) and cases cited therein. But see People v. Summerfield, 262 Cal. App.
2d 626, 69 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968).
19. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
The tendency of the recent decisions is to look into circumstances for compulsions to testify.
[Vol. XXV
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
the defendant's testimony.20 Mr. Justice Black did not dispute this fact.
Rather, he maintains that as a practical matter, because of the nature
of the presumed element, e.g., knowledge of importation of narcotic drugs,
the only effective way to rebut the presumption is for the defendant to
take the stand.2 ' The courts simply ignore the practical result, reasoning
that where there is a possibility to rebut the presumption with other
evidence the defendant is not really compelled to take the stand.
III. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RETAINING PRESUMPTIONS
The courts and legislatures have indicated a desire to preserve pre-
sumptions as well as a reluctance to confront Justice Black's constitutional
objections by weakening the impact of the presumptions, thereby avoid-
ing several of the constitutional infirmities. As several commentators have
indicated,22 the term "presumption" is presently applied to four separate
types of devices. In order of strength these are: (1) devices which do not
involve any instruction to the jury but merely preclude directed verdicts
or summary judgments by prescribing prima facie evidence in the sense
that proof of the basic fact is sufficient evidence of the presumed fact to
support a verdict requiring the finding of the presumed fact;' (2) de-
vices which take the form of permissive instructions as to what the trier
of fact may infer from proven facts; 24 (3) devices which switch the bur-
den of producing evidence on one or several issues; 2 and (4) devices
which switch the burden of persuasion on one or several issues.2 6
As the impact of presumptions is weakened by eliminating or qualify-
ing the device, an increasing number of constitutional infirmities can be
avoided. For example, where a judge interprets a presumption as merely
precluding a directed verdict and thus leaves the jury free to presume
some facts from the proven facts, it cannot be said that the presumptive
device undermines the right to trial by an impartial jury, although several
other of the constitutional arguments remain applicable. These attempts
to avoid the constitutional infirmities by both the courts and legislatures
indicate a recognition and, perhaps, a tacit acceptance of Mr. Justice
Black's position.
The validity and applicability of the arguments advanced by Mr.
Justice Black must ultimately depend upon whether the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights apply to the determination of guilt as to each element of
20. See note 1 supra.
21. For example, it is almost ludicrous to require an accused to trace the origin of con-
traband narcotics. This would be especially true of an indigent defendant.
22. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases:
A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969) ; Brown, The Constitutionality of Statutory
Criminal Law Presumptions, 34 U. CHi. L. REV. 141 (1966) [Hereinafter cited as Brown].
23. Brown at 141.
24. Id. at 142.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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the crime charged or only to the determination of guilt of the crime in
its entirety. For example, must the accused be presumed innocent of
every element of the offense charged or merely presumed innocent of
the offense in its entirety? Apparently, the courts refuse to recognize that
the determination of the constitutionality of presumptive devices must
ultimately rest upon this question because its logical answer is that the
safeguards of the Bill of Rights apply to each element."'
Mr. Justice Black assumed, as the courts have in the past,
that the Government, before it can secure a conviction, must
demonstrate to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt each essen-
tial element of the alleged offense.28
Yet, if presumptions are to be preserved without abandoning intellectual
honesty, the courts must take the position that the accused is not en-
titled to all of the Bill of Rights' safeguards in the determination of each
and every element of the offense. The Supreme Court apparently recog-
nized this situation in a footnote to Leary v. United States,29 when it sug-
gested that proof beyond a reasonable doubt may require a correlation
stronger than mere rational connection. By leaving the question unan-
swered, the Court ostensibly took the view that it has not been previously
decided. As it is obvious that "more likely than not"80 is not equivalent
to "beyond a reasonable doubt," the question referred to was apparently
whether the presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt was
applicable to each element of the offense.
In order to understand why the courts have sought to preserve pre-
sumptive devices despite what is, at best, dubious constitutionality, one
must examine the actual or supposed value of presumptive devices in the
system of criminal justice. Mr. Justice Black hinted at the supposed utility
of these devices. While recognizing the grave consequences of the traf-
fic in narcotic drugs which these devices help contain, he bitterly de-
nounces the
"activist" philosophy of some judges [who] construe our Con-
stitution as meaning what they now think it should mean in the
interest of 'fairness and decency' as they see it."
27. The Court may have determined this question in the affirmative in Cristoffel v.
United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949), but the case is not cited for the proposition in the pre-,
sumption cases. See also Sapir v. United States, 216 F.2d 722 (10th Cir.), modified, 348 U.S.
373 (1955) ; 29 Am. JUR. 2D. Evidence § 148 (1967).
28. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 427 (1970) (dissenting opinion). See also
United States v. Collier, 381 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1043 (1968);
Bryan v. United States, 373 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1967). The requirement that the prosecution
prove every element of the crime may be the functional equivalent of the proposition that
the defendant must be presumed innocent of every element of the crime, but the conceptual
differences are significant for the discussion below.
29. 395 U.S. 6, 36 n.64 (1969).
30. "More likely than not" is the degree of "rational connection" the Court was ap-
plying in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
31. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 426 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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He denounced those who attempt to strike a balance between the need
for individual safeguards and the need to protect society from the drug
traffic.
Neither the Due Process Clause nor any other constitutional lan-
guage vests any judge with such power .... One need look no
further than the language of that sacred document itself to be
assured that defendants charged with crime are to be accorded
due process of law-that is, they are to be tried as the Consti-
tution and the laws passed pursuant to it prescribe and not
under arbitrary procedures that a particular majority of sitting
judges may see fit to label as "fair" or "decent." 2
Again, Mr. Justice Black's argument follows logically if one adopts his
premises. Where, as here, the interpretation of the intent of the framers
of the Constitution is not as clear as he indicates, (presumptions, after
all, antedate the Constitution38) consideration of the consequences of find-
ing criminal statutory presumptions unconstitutional is warranted.
Commentators have traditionally maintained that presumptions save
the cost and time of proving the same relationship between similar events
in every case, provide a more uniform result, and generally aid in law
enforcement.8 4 The latter two "benefits" are clearly inconsistent with the
basic tenets of our system of criminal justice. Presumptions clearly have
an unconstitutional effect when they enable the state to convict a de-
fendant who would otherwise not be convicted if the state were required
to prove its case with actual evidence.85 Moreover, the right of each
defendant to be tried by a jury of his peers is probably the cornerstone
of our system of criminal justice. 0 Any attempt to induce greater uni-
formity than the untrammeled exercise of the jury system provides is
violative of the principles of our system of criminal justice. Adoption
of an accusatorial posture would probably also introduce greater uni-
formity into the results of criminal trials, but such a benefit clearly
could not justify the adoption of such a system nor harmonize it with
constitutional requirements.
Despite the grave consequences of overcrowded dockets, it is diffi-
cult to rationalize presumptions merely because they might save time and
cost. To do so would be to abandon the long accepted axiom "better
100 guilty go free than convict one innocent man. '37 Although the cur-
32. Id.
33. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, Com=NTARnS ON TEm LAWS OF ENGLAND § 1981 (Jones ed.
1916).
34. See, e.g., notes 17, 19, and 21 supra, and Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid
to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287 (1928).
35. This premise underlies each of the tests used to determine the validity of presump-
tions although it is not always verbalized. See, e.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934); Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
See also Gainey v. United States, 380 U.S. 63, 74 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
36. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
37. As Mr. Justice McReynolds has noted:
Once the thumbscrew and the following confession made conviction easy; but that
1971]
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rent catchphrase "law and order" seems to question the practicality
of this axiom in contemporary society, it certainly cannot be perfunctorily
discarded. Those who advocate abandoning this axiom as impractical
in a crime-ridden society are advocating, as Mr. Justice Black indicated,
that the constitutionally prescribed procedures be set aside in favor of
those" . .. that a particular majority of sitting judges may see fit to label
as 'fair' or 'decent'."38
Criminal presumptions serve another function which is, in fact, a
"benefit" to the system of criminal justice. The real value of presump-
tions can best be visualized by asking what the legislatures would sub-
stitute for presumptions if they were found unconstitutional. There are
two alternatives. Legislatures could retain the same crimes, and require
the state to prove with actual evidence each element of the crimes. On
the other hand, legislatures could simply make the crimes more general
by eliminating the elements that had been included, and subsequently
presumed to exist."' With the current pressures directed at legislatures by
the amorphous cry of "law and order," the legislators could be expected
to simply eliminate the presumed elements. By eliminating the previously
presumed elements, the legislatures will enlarge the class of persons
who would be convicted by precisely that number who could have been
able to rebut the presumptions as to these elements.' Regardless of how
constitutionally infirm the presumptive device, any person found guilty
of the basic fact is better off presumed guilty of the additional elements
than he would be if convicted of a crime involving the basic fact alone.4'
method was crude and, I suppose, now would be declared unlawful upon some
ground. Hereafter, presumption is to lighten the burden of the prosecutor. The vic-
tim will be spared the trouble of confessing and will go to his cell without mutila-
tion or disquieting outcry.
Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 420 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
38. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 426 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
39. The possibility of such an approach was recognized by Mr. Justice Black when he
indicated his belief that Congress could make mere possession of narcotics a crime eliminat-
ing the currently presumed elements which require illegal importation and knowledge of the
illegal importation. Id. at 433-34. See The Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, ch. 9,§§ 3 & 4, 38 Stat. 275 (1964). It was argued that the effect of the former section 174 was to
make possession a crime. The argument was rejected. Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19,
23 (1959) ; Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 63 (1957). The current narcotics drug law
makes knowing and intentional possession of proscribed drugs a crime. Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 12 F.C.A. Public Laws and
Administrative Material 1347 (1970). The change in the law which eliminated the elements
of illegal importation and knowledge of the illegal importation (see note 1 supra) may have
had the net effect of reducing the elements which a future defendant will be able to rebut.
However, the number of defendants capable of rebutting the previously included elements
is believed to be small based upon the general lack of successful appellate challenges to the
former presumption. The new Act is predicated on the federal powers over interstate com-
merce and the general welfare. The interstate commerce power would seem broad enough
to support the Act. See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); Griego v.
United States, 298 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1962).
40. The courts seem to believe the class of persons is fairly large but no competent
statistics appear to exist to substantiate this belief. See note 39 supra.
41. Assuming sentences do not change, the increase or decrease in convictions under the
new narcotics law should provide a possibility for empirical verification of this assumption.
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At least in the current state of events there exists a possibility that the
accused can rebut the presumption. In summary, presumptions, as a prac-
tical matter, seem to provide the accused with defenses to the crime not
available under the foreseeable alternative.
It is believed that legislators choose to provide these "defenses"
when they are unable to define a crime broadly enough to encompass
activities harmful to the society without including in that definition per-
sons they do not wish to punish as criminals. For example, Congress, in
order to stop the production and sale of untaxed alcohol, outlawed "pos-
session, or custody, or control, of any still or distilling apparatus set up
which is not registered . . .1" as well as providing penalties for any
person who "carries on the business of a distiller or rectifier without
having given bond as required by law. . ."1 and created a presumption
of "possession" and "carrying on" from "unexplained presence" at a
still." Clearly, Congress desired to include everyone participating in the
illegal operation yet wished to exclude those who just happened upon the
scene. The presumptive device enabled this to be done. If the actual
effect of presumptions is to keep legislatures from creating general crimes
which would make innocent behavior criminal, they may be worth
saving. 5
As previously indicated, the courts generally do not question whether
presumptions should be preserved or are worth preserving. Indeed, they
not only seem to assume they are worth preserving, but often treated them
as indispensable. When the constitutionality of presumptions is ques-
tioned, the courts simply decide whether the presumption in question
is "fair" or "permissible." The test unanimously applied by the courts
is whether there is a "rational connection" between the fact proved and
the fact presumed. 6
IV. THE CURRENT TEST AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
Historically, three separate tests have been suggested for determin-
ing the constitutionality of presumptions: (1) the "rational connection"
test; (2) the "greater includes the lesser" test; and (3) the "comparative
convenience" test. The rational connection test, the earliest and most
widely accepted test, was first propounded by the Supreme Court in
42. 26 U.S.C. § 5601 (a) (1) (1964).
43. 26 U.S.C. § 5601 (a) (4) (1964).
44. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5601 (b)(1), (b)(2) (1964). See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63
(1965), which found this device to be constitutional. See also Bozza v. United States, 330
U.S. 160 (1947).
45. What the authors are suggesting is that voters will put pressure on legislatures to
broaden the definitions of crimes in an attempt to secure more convictions. In so doing,
the electorate will be depriving itself of its constitutional safeguards. The authors realize
that, in essence, this statement says that courts should "stretch" the Constitution to protect
us from ourselves.
46. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) ; Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6 (1969) ; State v. Kahler, 232 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1970).
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Mobile J. & Kansas City Railroad v. Turnipseed.7 This test was based
upon the notion that presumptions are regularized inferences from cir-
cumstantial evidence and that such inferences are fair if the basic
facts have some reasonable tendency to establish the fact presumed.
There has been considerable discussion as to how strong this tendency
must be; that is, whether the test requires a "rational connection" or
merely an "inferential connection."4" The earlier cases seem to require
only the latter, but this view has been abandoned by the Supreme Court,
at least since the decision in United States v. Leary.49 Today, there is no
question that the presumed fact must be at least more likely than not to
occur whenever the basic fact exists.' °
The other two tests differ in that they are both non-inferential, they
are not concerned with the inferences between the proved fact and the
presumed fact in determining the constitutionality of the presumption.
The "greater includes the lesser" test, promulgated by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Ferry v. Ramsey,51 as applied to criminal statutes,52 would
simply ask whether the legislature had the power to make a crime of the
basic or proven fact alone. This test is based upon the premise that if the
legislature had the constitutional power to impose liability even absent
the presumed elements, it could clearly create a possible defense by
adding an element, presuming its existence and allowing the accused
to negate it. Although this case has been frequently discussed by com-
mentators, it has received a less enthusiastic reception in the courts.'
The "comparative convenience" test, first promulgated by Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo in dicta in Morrison v. Californa,54 asks whether proof of
the basic fact is enough, in view of the comparative access of the parties
to the evidence on the particular question, to make it just to compel the
defendant to come forward with the evidence.
Although the continued validity of comparative convenience as an
alternative test is subject to some dispute,55 at least since Tot v. United
States,"8 it has been generally accepted that comparative convenience is
47. 219 U.S. 35 (1910). It is worth noting that Turnipseed was a civil action for per-
sonal injuries caused by railroad equipment. "Rational connection," originated in a civil
action where the burdens of proof and persuasion differ radically from those in the criminal
area where the test has subsequently been applied.
48. Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 CoLum. L. REv.
527, 537 (1955) ; Note, The Validity of Statutory Presumptions of Crime Under the Federal
Constitution, 22 TEx. L. Rav. 75 (1944).
49. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
50. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
51. 277 U.S. 88 (1928). See the state court opinion at 122 Kan. 675, 253 Pac. 416
(1927).
52. Ferry, like Turnispeed, was also a civil action.
53. See Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 COLum. L.
REv. 527, 534 (1955) [Hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutionality].
54. 291 U.S. 82 (1934). Cf. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
55. Note, Constitutionality, at 535-56.
56. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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not an independent test of validity of presumptions but only a corollary
to the doctrine of rational connection. 57
V. INFIRMITIES OF THE PRESENT TEST
The authors maintain that the rational connection test is, in fact,
irrational. Its acceptance by the courts has been a source of confusion
obscuring the questions of the constitutionality of criminal statutory pre-
sumptions. While the relationship between the fact proved and the fact
presumed is relevant in determining the fairness of the presumption, it is
not relevant or responsive to the constitutional questions involved. The
attacks upon criminal statutory presumptions as espoused by Mr. Justice
Black are not that presumptions are "unfair," 58 but that they are un-
constitutional. To reply to arguments that presumptions deprive the ac-
cused of designated constitutionally protected rights by saying the
presumption is fair because there is a certain relationship between the
proved and presumed facts is simply illogical and unresponsive. The
rational connection test rests upon the premise that if the presumption
is fair it is constitutional. Mr. Justice Black indicated that such a premise
substitutes the shifting standards of fairness of a majority of the Court
for the fixed standards of the Constitution. 9 Perhaps in no other area
is the conflict in constitutional philosophy between the "activists" and
the "literalists" so clearly discernible as it is here. In this area, however,
it is submitted that the "activist" philosophy proves too much. Its appli-
cation undercuts guarantees that are clear, unambiguous, and essential,
and substitutes no greater guarantee than a transitory concept of what
appears fair to the Court today. The framers of the Bill of Rights deter-
mined what was fair and expressed their determination in language which
is far from inartful. The Court has only to decide whether the constitu-
tional standards have been satisfied.
Even aside from the fact that the application of the rational connec-
tion test is totally unresponsive to the constitutional arguments, the deci-
sions applying this test are among the most poorly reasoned decisions
of the Court. At times the reasoning is nearly circular. In United States
v. Gainey,60 the Court wrote concerning statutory presumptions:
Yet it is precisely when courts have been unable to agree as to
the exact relevance of a frequently occurring fact in an atmos-
57. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
58. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 42S-26 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
59. As Mr. Justice Black stated:
Our Constitution was not written in the sands to be washed away by each wave of
new judges blown in by each successive political wind which brings new political
administrations into temporary power. Rather, our Constitution was fashioned to
perpetuate liberty and justice by marking clear, explicit, and lasting constitutional
boundaries for trials.
Id. at 426.
60. 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).
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phere pregnant with illegality that Congress' resolution is
appropriate.
The significance of the remark is somewhat obscure. According to the
rational connection test, the validity of the legislative action will depend
upon the courts' determination of the relevance of these same frequently
occurring facts. If the courts, after reasonable inquiry into the facts, dif-
fer concerning the relevancy of these facts, it would seem that any legis-
latively created presumption would be invalid according to the rational
connection standard. Had the Court delved into the "atmosphere pregnant
with illegality" it might be forced to the conclusion that what is really
being created is a crime of reputation. 61 The line between such an "at-
mosphere" with one or two elements added then presumed away, and the
crime actually charged in Thompson v. City of Louisville62 is probably
too close for intellectual comfort.
Moreover, because the courts probably recognize that the rational
connection test is not responsive to the constitutional challenges, they fre-
quently try to avoid these issues by loosely interpreting the statutes in
question. Mr. Justice Black wrote in dissent in United States v. Gainey:
First of all, let me say that I am at a loss to understand the
Court's puzzling statement that "where the only evidence is of
presence the statute does not require the judge to submit the case
to the jury, nor does it preclude the grant of a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict." The provisions in question both say
unqualifiedly that "presence of the defendant shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction" unless the defendant
explains his presence. The Court holds that this statutory com-
mand in § 5601 (b) (2) is valid, but then for some reason adds
that judges are free to ignore it or, after telling juries that they
may rely on it, are free to set aside the verdicts of those juries
that do. In other words, under the Court's holding the judge is
left free to take the extraordinary course of following a valid
statute or not, as he chooses. Judges are not usually given such
unlimited discretion to disregard valid statutes. And as the Court
indicates elsewhere in its opinion, it was to prevent judges from
setting aside jury verdicts based on presence alone that Congress
passed this statute in the first place. Besides being almost self-
contradictory, it amounts to an emasculation of these statutory
provisions, I think, to say that the judge was not required to
tell the jury about them.
Furthermore, when the rational connection test is utilized, the state
is not really relieved of the burden of repeatedly establishing the same
relationship between facts. While the presumption relieves the state of
61. See People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1229
(1934).
62. 362 U.S. 204 (1960).
63. 380 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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the burden of establishing the relationship between proved and presumed
facts at the trial level, 64 the burden is returned on appeal. In fact, on ap-
peal, the rationality of the inference often becomes a determinative issue.
Further, at least for several types of presumptions, the same relationship
must repeatedly be established, as the rationality of the presumption may
vary according to changing conditions. Thus, the time-saving rationale is
questionable, especially in light of the congestion of appellate as well as
trial dockets.
VI. A SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE
As previously indicated, the validity of each of the arguments chal-
lenging the constitutionality of these presumptive devices must ultimately
turn upon whether the accused's Bill of Rights' guarantees apply to each
element of the crime or to the crime in its entirety. If criminal statutory
presumptions are to be preserved, the Court must conclude that there is
no constitutional requirement that the accused be offered all safeguards
in the determination of the existence of each element of the offense
charged.
If this conclusion is reached, the "greater includes the lesser" test pro-
mulgated by Mr. Justice Holmes becomes the logical test for determining
the constitutionality of statutory criminal law presumptions. 5 Viewed in
this perspective, the Court would simply maintain that, as to those ele-
ments added to the crime by the legislature affording defenses to persons
whose activities they did not wish to label as criminal, the accused has no
constitutional guarantees. Therefore, so long as the legislature has the
power to make the proved fact alone a crime, there are no rights to be
undermined despite the logic of Mr. Justice Black's arguments. In short,
if criminal statutory presumptive devices are to be maintained, the ap-
plicable test should be the "greater includes the lesser" test. In addition,
some form of inferential test, along the lines of the "rational connection"
test, should be applied to satisfy the requirements of the due process
clause, in the sense that totally arbitrary legislative action should be pro-
scribed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The "rational connection" test is totally unresponsive to the constitu-
tional questions it seeks to resolve. As a test of civil presumptions it might
suffice, but as a test of the validity of statutory criminal presumptive de-
vices it is patently inadequate. The constitutional challenges that the
64. However, successful challenges to the validity of a presumptive device at the trial
level are not an impossibility. United States v. Cox, 432 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also
Annot., 13 L. Ed. 2d 1138 (1965) ; Annot., 23 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1970).
65. Dean McCormick noted that ". .. the greater includes the less argument seems to be
a persuasive counter to the general charge of unfairness implicit in the 'rational connection'
atttack." 22 TEx L. REV. 75, 80 n.18 (1944).
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"rational connection" test attempts to answer are logically sound. The
validity of these constitutional challenges turns upon whether constitu-
tional safeguards apply to each element of a crime. This question should
be answered in the affirmative and criminal statutory presumptions should
therefore be abolished. However, if the need for criminal statutory pre-
sumptions is compelling, the test of those presumptions should be rational
in operation as well as in name. If the issues are confronted, the position
that the Bill of Rights does not apply to each element of an offense will
probably be reached. If this position is accepted, the adoption of "the
greater includes the lesser" test is the next obvious step.
The Court should accept Mr. Justice Black's position. If, however,
these presumptions in fact cannot be abolished, the Court should at least
adopt a test that resolves the issues presented.
